Even in the wake of the biggest financial crash of the postwar era, the United States continues to rely on Securities and Exchange Commission oversight and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which set tougher rules for boards, management, and public accounting firms to protect the interests of shareholders. Such reliance is badly misplaced. In Corporate Governance, Jonathan Macey argues that less government regulation--not more--is what's needed to ensure that managers of public companies keep their promises to investors.

Macey tells how heightened government oversight has put a stranglehold on what is the best protection against malfeasance by self-serving management: the market itself. Corporate governance, he shows, is about keeping promises to shareholders; failure to do so results in diminished investor confidence, which leads to capital flight and other dire economic consequences. Macey explains the relationship between corporate governance and the various market and nonmarket institutions and mechanisms used to control public corporations; he discusses how nonmarket corporate governance devices such as boards and whistle-blowers are highly susceptible to being co-opted by management and are generally guided more by self-interest and personal greed than by investor interests. In contrast, market-driven mechanisms such as trading and takeovers represent more reliable solutions to the problem of corporate governance. Inefficient regulations are increasingly hampering these important and truly effective corporate controls. Macey examines a variety of possible means of corporate governance, including shareholder voting, hedge funds, and private equity funds.

Corporate Governance reveals why the market is the best guardian of shareholder interests.

Enron, Worldcom, Cirio, Parmalat. Dopo ogni grande scandalo d'impresa, la risposta dell'opinione pubblica è sempre la stessa: servono nuove regole. È davvero così? Riflettendo sull'esperienza americana, Jonathan Macey sostiene che una maggiore regolamentazione dello Stato non è quello che serve per garantire che i dirigenti delle società per azioni mantengano le promesse fatte agli investitori. Macey, fra i maggiori studiosi di corporate governance al mondo, riflette su come la crescente influenza degli Stati negli affari societari inibisca il miglior giudice e regolatore del comportamento dei manager: il mercato dei capitali. In fatto di governance societaria, sono tante le promesse non mantenute dalle norme. Mentre, al contrario, strumenti che fanno perno sulle forze di mercato come il trading e le acquisizioni rappresentano soluzioni più affidabili per superare i problemi posti dalla corporate governance. Paradossalmente, la regolamentazione tende ad ostacolare proprio questi meccanismi di controllo.

The book presents different perspectives that explain the prohibition of insider trading and the way it affects various aspects of life on the stock market.